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COMMENTS ON EDGAR OLSEN'S "IS RENT CONTROL
GOOD SOCIAL POLICY?"*
HARVEY S. ROSEN
Olsen's analysis is primarily a critical survey of positive analyses of
rent controls-it describes how they work and their impact upon the
economy.' I would like to begin by viewing Olsen's main findings
through the lens of a systematic normative conceptual framework pro-
vided by economic theory. Then I shift from the positive and normative
analysis of rent controls to the public choice question of why they are
enacted in the first place.
WELFARE ECONOMICS AND RENT CONTROLS
The normative framework used by most economists to evaluate pub-
lic policy is "welfare economics," the branch of economic theory con-
cerned with the social desirability of alternative economic states. The
centerpiece of welfare economics is the so-called Fundamental Theorem,
which states that as long as producers and consumers act as perfect com-
petitors, then under certain conditions (discussed later), the economy's
resources will be allocated efficiently, without any need for centralized
intervention (shades of Adam Smith's "invisible hand"). To the extent
that these certain conditions do not hold in a given situation, then gov-
ernment intervention may enhance efficiency. In addition, the theory of
welfare economics indicates that even if the allocation of resources is effi-
cient, government intervention may be necessary if the distribution of
income is inconsistent with society's ethical beliefs. 2 However, such re-
distributions should be undertaken in a way that minimizes any detri-
mental effects on efficiency.
The crucial question thus becomes, what are the "certain condi-
tions" required for the Fundamental Theorem to hold. Very briefly,
markets may fail to allocate resources efficiently under the following
* Prepared for the John M. Olin Foundation Conference on the Law and Economics of
Urban issues, School of Law at the University of Virginia, November 8-9, 1991.
1. Edgar 0. Olsen, Is Rent Control Good Social Policy?, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 931 (1991).
2. Even though distributional and market failure problems provide opportunities for govern-
ment intervention in the economy, they do not require it. The fact that the market-generated alloca-
tion of resources is imperfect does not mean that the government is necessarily capable of doing
better.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
conditions3 :
Market power. When some firms have the ability to raise the price
of a commodity above the incremental cost of its production, an inef-
ficiently small quantity of resources will be devoted to that good.
Public goods. Consider a commodity such as national defense. The
fact that one person benefits from the presence of the armed forces does
not prevent anyone else from doing so simultaneously. Goods like de-
fense, which are non-rival in consumption, are referred to as public
goods. People have an incentive not to reveal a public good's true worth
to themselves-they can free ride on other people's expenditures. A mar-
ket mechanism therefore may not lead to sufficient resources being de-
voted to such goods.
Externalities. In a properly functioning market, the price of a com-
modity reflects the costs of all resources that were consumed in its pro-
duction. An externality refers to a situation in which individuals or firms
may use resources for which they do not have to pay. The classic exam-
ple is pollution. As a consequence, the price of the commodity is too low
relative to its social costs, and the market provides an inefficiently large
quantity of the commodity. Externalities can also be positive-the be-
havior of one entity has a direct positive effect on the welfare of another.
In this case, the commodity will be under-provided by the market.
Asymmetric Information. The competitive model assumes that in-
formation is perfect, or that in situations of uncertainty, all agents share
the same degree of uncertainty. However, when information is asymmet-
ric-one party to an exchange knows more than the other-markets may
not operate efficiently. For example, a sub-optimal amount of health in-
surance may be provided because insurance companies have poorer infor-
mation about an individual's health status than the individual herself.
In summary, whenever economists suspect that something is amiss
in a market, then, like the police chief in the film CASABLANCA, 4 they
round up the usual suspects: market power, public goods, externalities
and asymmetric information. If none of these is present, then there is no
reason to believe that government intervention will enhance efficiency.
When I view Olsen's paper through the lens of welfare economics,
what it tells me is that in rental housing markets, when we interrogate
each of our suspects, no one turns up guilty. In the long run, Olsen
argues that apartment owners appear to earn competitive rates of return,
3. For a more complete discussion, see Francis M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72
Q.J. ECON. 351 (1958).
4. CASABLANCA (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1942).
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so market power is not an issue. Apartments are rival in consumption,
so no public goods problem is present. If rent controls lead to more
owner-occupied housing and if owner-occupation per se produces benefits
to other members of society, then rent control may be viewed as a way of
addressing externalities. But as Olsen argues, there is no reason to be-
lieve that such externalities exist, and even if they do, rent control is an
inefficient way to encourage owner-occupation.
Finally, there is no reason to believe that there are sufficiently seri-
ous informational asymmetries to impede the workings of this market.
In short, Olsen's findings imply that there is no efficiency basis for gov-
ernment intervention in this market.
Of course, as noted above, the theory of welfare economics suggests
that efficiency may be sacrificed to achieve a fairer distribution of in-
come. However, Olsen shows that this caveat does not save rent con-
trol-at least if "fairer" means a more egalitarian distribution of
income-because the benefits of rent control do not flow to people with
the lowest incomes. Moreover, because the evidence cited by Olsen
shows that rent control distorts people's consumption bundles, it is an
inefficient way to subsidize the people who do benefit from the program.
Before leaving welfare economics, it is important to note that as an
ethical system, its distinctive characteristic is its concern with results.
Situations are evaluated in terms of the allocation of resources, and not
in terms of the processes used to determine that allocation. Hence, one
may sometimes reject a policy that enhances efficiency and/or income
equality if one's ethical views suggest that the process involved is unde-
sirable. Conversely, one may accept a policy that is inefficient and ine-
galitarian in its effects if the process somehow is viewed as particularly
desirable. Olsen's analysis suggests that to the extent that rent control
raises issues beyond the scope of traditional welfare economics, they
work against the policy. Specifically, he argues convincingly that a pol-
icy that redistributes income away from people simply on the basis of
their occupations (and no other criteria, such as ability to pay) is
undesirable.
WHY ARE THERE RENT CONTROLS?
With admirable brevity and clarity, Olsen's paper answers the ques-
tion posed in its title. Is rent control good social policy? The results of
positive economic analysis reported in the paper together with the nor-
mative framework of welfare economics indicate that the answer is a re-
sounding no. This immediately leads to another question: Why are rent
1991] 957
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controls so popular? While the literature on the effects of rent controls is
voluminous, not much has been written on why they are enacted in the
first place.
One possibility is that policy makers simply don't understand the
consequences of rent control. While one should never underestimate the
importance of ignorance, it is worthwhile to speculate on whether rent
control might be the outcome of a process in which self-interested and
well-informed actors attempt to maximize their own well-being.
In a model suggested by Dennis Epple, 5 the reason that rent con-
trols come into existence is that governments cannot pre-commit to a
policy of never having rent controls. In his model, rational residents of a
town realize that if rent controls are ever imposed, the effective housing
supply will contract, and if they ever have to leave their current dwell-
ings, they will find themselves unable to find an apartment, or the price
of an apartment may be relatively high. Hence, ex ante, it is in their
interest to vote to commit against rent control. However, in the absence
of the ability to make such a commitment, then ex post it may be in the
interests of people to vote for rent control. And realizing this, suppliers
will contract the supply of housing in anticipation of the imposition of
rent controls, leading to a lower equilibrium level of welfare.
Epple's intriguing result is an example of a more general phenome-
non referred to as the "time inconsistency of optimal policy." Unless the
government can credibly promise not to renege, it cannot conduct the
fully efficient policy. If Epple is correct, then acting upon the policy im-
plications of Olsen's analysis will require more than simple education.
Rather, it requires the development of some mechanism for governments
to make their promises about rent control credible. This would appear to
be a fruitful area of collaborative research for lawyers and economists.
5. Dennis Eppel, Rent Control with Reputation: Theory and Evidence (1988) (on file with
Chicago-Kent Law Review).
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